The Chavista governor of Portuguesa Antonio Muñoz reportedly stopped land invasions and maintained good relationships with grower associations in the state . Under Muñoz’s successor, Wilmar Castro, growers and state officials reported that land invasions by peasants and state intervention on estates increased . In general, however, producer associations stated that they maintained non-conflictive working relations with state institutions . ASOPORTUGUESA, for example, collaborated on a number of seed and crop research programs with the National Institute of Agricultural Research throughout the Chavista period. More importantly, broader agro-food policy continued to evolve in the Chavista period in a way that tended to shield a large number of commercial growers from expropriation. As the government became increasingly concerned about food availability it largely avoided intervention in commercial cereal or oilseeds producers. INTI officials in Portuguesa stated that as a matter of policy, productive farms were not targets for redistribution in order to ensure agricultural production . Even some activist peasants in the reform sector articulated a similar position that if land was in production campesinos considered it off the table for occupation. In Yaracuy state, for example, where conflict over land has been particularly pointed and conflictive, one peasant leader who himself had helped to occupy an estate said large landowners who were productive were ‘welcome’ . Through the Chavista period,dutch bucket hydroponic state agro-food policy became increasingly focused on maintaining the productive base for domestic provisioning and distribution of foodstuffs and less on the breaking up of historic land relations in rural areas.
Where the state has accelerated and widened its intervention in the agriculture sector has been primarily in marketing and distribution components of the food system or in particular crops such as coffee. Figure 20 shows acceleration of expropriation in the food sector beginning in 2009. These expropriations, however, can be read as part of a broader state strategy to ensure agricultural production and food distribution chains, rather than attempts to dismantle landholder power. The Venezuelan government, for example, nationalized major coffee companies Fama de America and Café Madrid in 2009 as part of a strategy to increase control over the distribution and processing of coffee and ensure its availability in state food distribution networks. Expropriations of the supermarket chains Éxito and Cada, and of agro-chemical company AgroIsleña, targeted not landowners, but up and downstream components of the agro-food system to support production at the farm level of all sectors of agriculture and, again, food availability at the market level. In addition, since 2003 the Chavista government sought strategic, unofficial ‘alliances’ with business interests that were considered important to the nation’s economic development . After the 2002-2003 oil strike promoted by FEDECAMARAS, the Chávez government declared it would favor non-striking business interests by providing them with access to dollars for imports at preferential rates Such concessions demonstrate a strategy of reconciliation between the capitalist sectors and the state in order to ensure macroeconomic stability. In Portuguesa, patterns of land occupation by peasants and government intervention in estates by and large circumvented the major cereal and oilseeds producers that formed the backbone of the state’s agricultural economy.
Growers did state, however, that as a preventative measure to land occupation by peasants they often planted ‘holding crops’ on land that were not harvested due to their general unprofitability—such as beans . An INTI representative in Portuguesa stated that when land occupations on estates did occur, the local INTI office declared them as illegitimate and withheld support from the occupiers including inspections and any granting of official rights to remain on the land .Where there was significant state intervention in private estates it was primarily related to continued conflict over timber plantations owned by the transnational packaging corporation Smurfit and in areas devoted principally to extensive cattle ranching. Most peasant occupations in Portuguesa during this study’s field periods were concentrated in these tree farms near the agro-industrial core and in cattle ranching areas that were located more on the state’s agrarian periphery. The peripheral lands—such as in the municipality of Guanarito—were relatively distant from major infrastructure, had inferior soils to those in the agribusiness core, were less likely to have mechanized production systems, and were less integrated into agro-food processing chains. Parcels in Guanarito were more likely to be perceived as idle and, thus, scenes of peasant occupation and state intervention. The Dos Caminos estate seized by INTI—one of the cases cited by local growers as indicative of government pressure on productive, private land in the state—was primarily involved in cattle and dairy operations, not cereal or oilseeds production . A land occupation at the San Rafael de Onote estate was ruled illegal in 2012 on the grounds that the estate was productive due to its maize and porcine production . That same year the Supreme Court reversed an initial ruling against the owners of the Palo Gordo estate after it was declared to be productive.
These cases reinforce the argument that cereal producers were not subject to significant land expropriation pressures. In a general policy climate of ensuring staple foods, the agro-industrial core of cereal and oilseeds producers appeared to be under relatively little threat of land seizure from the government. This is not to disregard the role of peasant pressure in influencing targets of government intervention in land and the shape and pace of land redistribution28 but rather to suggest that the major thrust of land redistribution has not been directed at sectors of commercial producers even in areas where they control a majority of the best and most productive lands. Landowners have used violence and intimidation in the reform period to fight against the agrarian reform. According to peasant groups, between 2003 and 2011, an estimated 256 campesinos were killed , likely by hired gunmen. According to campesino groups, no one has been convicted of any of the killings . That no landowner has been convicted of a peasant murder demonstrates the persistence of latifundio influence both regionally and in the judicial system where the deaths are investigated and prosecuted. This is despite nominal control of the judiciary by the Chavista political party, PSUV. Peasant groups have, thus, had to contend with the threat of violence when organizing for land. Land reform-related violence against peasants—as can be seen in Table 8—has largely been concentrated in four or five states within Venezuela. Portuguesa ranks as the state with the 4th highest number of peasant murders. Relevant to this dissertation’s argument, deaths were not common in the main agroindustrial areas of Portuguesa. The bulk of killings in Portuguesa occurred in Guanare and Guanarito municipalities .
Guanarito, as discussed, is an area home to relatively extensive dairy farmers that held more idle land than other areas where cereal and oilseeds production is integrated into agro-industrial chains. Peasant occupations that occurred primarily in Guanarito and nearby geographically and economically isolated areas engendered more violent responses. That commercial farmers in the agro-industrial corridor faced less occupation pressure underscores their relatively ‘safer’ position in terms of land redistribution pressures. Landed interests can also leverage their position as employers in land conflicts to blunt and fragment peasant pressure for state intervention. The case of Smurfit Kappa is an instructive example. Beginning in the 1980s, Smurfit began toacquire and operate tree plantations eventually totaling 31,000 hectares of Caribbean Pine and Eucalyptus in Portuguesa and Lara states . Smurfit’s expansion precipitated conflicts with peasants as farmers lost land or retained only limited access to areas that were surrounded by newly fenced tree plantations. In addition, there were a series of conflicts between managers and workers over working conditions and benefits. Conflict between Smurfit and peasants has continued throughout the Chavista era and has been heightened by the redistributive possibilities represented by the 2001 Land Law and increasing petitions for land and peasant occupations of some tree plantation areas. Relations between Smurfit, the state,dutch buckets system and peasant groups that this conflict has engendered is explored more thoroughly in the following chapter. The relevant point at this juncture is the dual strategy Smurfit has taken in order to diminish historical and resurgent peasant pressure. On one hand Smurfit has ceded certain parcels that INTI has classified as apt for crop production to the state in exchange for retaining ownership of other plantation areas.
This includes pre-Chavista negotiation where Smurfit gave up the 2,000 ha estate La Productora—which later became a co-managed Unit of Socialist Production in 2008—as well as more recent acquiescing to INTI inspections and redistribution of land to agrarian reform groups under the understanding Smurfit would be able harvest the timber before ceding control as well as receive indemnification from the state . On the other hand, over time Smurfit improved pay and benefits for workers, including providing scholarships to families of estate employees, which have became important subsidies for local households . Much of these benefits were won by workers after violent labor struggles that predate the Chavista era. These historical gains in labor conditions have contributed to Smurfit workers opposing peasant groups occupying Smurfit plantation areas, although both groups actively identify as government supporters. In 2012, I saw signs placed by Smurfit’s workers’ union along Portuguesa’s main highway reading “We are not exploited” and “We are also the revolution” to counter arguments that the seizure of Smurfit’s plantations would address exploitative labor relations as part of the Chavista socialist revolution. Smurfit workers saw peasant calls for land as threatening their relatively well-paid jobs whose benefits they obtained via hard-fought labor struggles. As part of the agrarian reform union members had been offered land they currently worked on as Smurfit employees, but stated that as laborers they received greater and more secure benefits than they could obtain as farmers on recovered plantation land . Workers cited an impression of general improductivity of agrarian reform settlements in the area, as well as the unreliability of state institutions that provided support to settlements . In response to threats of nationalization, the union negotiated its own proposal with Smurfit to cede certain parcels to the state in exchange for retention of core lands and then delivered the proposal itself to INTI officials . Essentially, the Chavista workers’ union negotiated with the state on Smurfit’s behest in order to constrain peasant land claims. This effectively fragmented the Chavista base’s stated position on land reform in the area. Reading dynamics between the state and the commercial sector as uniformly antagonistic and combative glosses over a series of more ambivalent relations. Violence against peasants, although significant, has largely been isolated to a relatively few areas of historical land conflict where peasant organizations have pushed for occupation of estates. State expropriation of land holdings has primarily been limited to areas of extensive cattle ranching rather than commercial commodity crop production . And while expropriations of supermarkets and large cattle estates have been featured in media headlines, these nationalizations have often targeted foreign, not domestic capital— the supermarket chain Éxito, for example, was owned by a French company—and land seizures are often negotiated with landowners, leaving large parts of estates, most likely the most productive and profitable areas, with the previous owners. In addition, commercial cereal producers in Portuguesa have faced relatively little risk of land redistribution even in areas that are highly Chavista. State intervention and peasant pressure in Portuguesa has instead been concentrated in cattle ranching areas on the peripheries of the state or in areas with foreign-owned tree plantations. As issues of food prices and availability in supermarkets serve as salient electoral weaknesses of the ruling party, combative rhetoric and threats of intervention of food processors take place in a wider policy context that seeks to incentivize production in all sectors of agriculture. I now move to discuss how certain Chavista agro-food policies contribute to accumulation in the commercial agriculture sector, even as state rhetoric maintains a pro-poor and pro-peasant character. To support agricultural production, the Chavista government in 2001 reasserted lending requirements of commercial banks to the agriculture sector. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance are tasked with setting the percentage that commercial banks must lend to agriculture each year or face sanction. The amount required is set by the central government through the Committee for Monitoring the Agrarian Portfolio . The mandated percentage fluctuates from month to month but in general there is a 20-25% target, with a ceiling of 30% .Commercial banks have largely failed to meet the mandated lending targets .