In addition, reformers confront obstacles stemming from agricultural policies themselves. Here my argument builds on Pierson’s analysis of welfare state retrenchment. Retrenchment of the welfare state is a process whereby policymakers seek to cut spending on social benefits. Examples of retrenchment policies include reducing unemployment benefits, raising the retirement age, and increasing co-payments for health care. Pierson asserts that welfare state reform is a different process than welfare state expansion. Welfare expansion is an exercise in credit claiming while retrenchment is an act of blame avoidance. When expanding the welfare state, politicians are enacting “popular policies in a relatively undeveloped interest environment” whereas retrenching the welfare state “requires elected officials to pursue unpopular policies that must withstand the scrutiny of both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups” . In practice, cutting social benefits tends to be unpopular, politically delicate, and difficult to pursue . Pierson identifies several reasons why reasons why welfare state retrenchment is a different and more difficult process than expansion. The first reason is that there is an asymmetry in perception of gains and losses, with voters tending to remember losses more than gains . At election time, voters are more likely to sanction politicians for cuts to programs than they are to reward them for commensurate benefits. Second, when social programs are cut, the costs are highly concentrated, immediate, and sharply felt, while the benefits are typically uncertain, diffuse, long-term, and of low visibility. For beneficiaries of social programs,lettuce vertical farming retrenchment has a direct impact on their well-being. The pensions of senior citizens are smaller or those without jobs no longer qualify for unemployment benefits.
By contrast, the benefits of slightly lower public spending to the public at large are small and diffuse. This asymmetry of impact tends to produce an asymmetry of mobilization, with the groups threatened by retrenchment taking to the streets to defend their benefits, while the general population that might gain slightly says home. Third, the welfare state creates its own support bases or “policy communities”, in Pierson’s language. When social policies are threatened by retrenchment, policy communities are activated and mobilized to defend them. Proposed reductions or other negative changes to retirement benefits in the US, would, for example, mobilize the AARP . The challenge posed by imposing concentrated cuts on coordinated beneficiary groups is further compounded by the fact that many of these policies have strengthened the policy communities they serve over time and have more broadly increased opportunities for these groups to access politicians. As a result, policymakers must contend with an active and visible resistance that will mobilize to oppose their cuts. The fourth and final reason why welfare state retrenchment is different from expansion is the influence that past policy decisions exert on current options for reform. “Lock-in” refers to a situation whereby certain early policy decisions “greatly increase the cost of adopting once possible alternatives and inhibit exit from a current policy path” . A classic example is public pension systems. In the 1930s and 1940s, politicians were free to choose from a number of different models. Most countries chose so-called “pay as you go” systems under which current employees pay for the benefits of current retirees, rather than pre-funding their own pensions. By the 1980s, Pierson contends, reform options were narrowly constrained.
Reformers could not easily shift to a private pension system since they would need to find a way to pay for the pensions of existing retirees along with future private pensions . Lock-in also impeded straight-forward benefit cuts, since retirees and those nearing retirement were counting on promised benefits and often lacked the time and opportunity to boost savings sufficiently to offset program cuts. Pierson finds that even those leaders most inclined to retrench the welfare state, Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, ultimately failed. In both cases, the reforms that were adopted fell far short of their proponents’ objectives, and social spending did not decline. In the end, policymakers in the US and UK simply could not overcome resistance from program beneficiaries or the challenges inherent in the existing policy structures. There are many similarities between the process of retrenching the welfare state and that of reforming agricultural policy. European agricultural policies are, essentially, welfare for farmers . As with the traditional welfare state, retrenchment of the agricultural welfare state is an entirely different process from the construction of the agricultural welfare state in the first place. As with the welfare state, cutting agricultural policy is unpopular and politically sensitive. CAP reform has, in the past, been delayed due to important elections in member state countries, and heads of government have publicly expressed a desire to weaken or delay reforms until they are out of office. In the same way that governments seeking to retrench welfare programs must contend with the preferences of the supporters or beneficiaries of those programs, agricultural policymakers must contend with the interests of farmers. Much like social policy retrenchment, attempts to impose cuts on agricultural policy mobilize a well organized and entrenched opposition.
Cuts, if they are imposed at all, are typically much narrower than originally proposed. While social and agricultural policy reformers face many of the same challenges, retrenching the agricultural welfare state may be even more difficult than retrenching the social policy welfare state. One reason is that the farmers themselves are key actors in policy implementation. Governments often rely on national farmer organizations to both explain and enact key agricultural policies. The very programs that assist farmers have preserved this group and its organizations. By contrast, groups that represent welfare claimants play no role in policy implementation. This dependence on farmers and their organizations makes it difficult for governments to enact retrenchment policies that would jeopardize cooperation. In addition,vertical grow shelf farmer organizations can potentially frustrate or check retrenchment initiatives at the implementation phase. A second feature that makes agricultural retrenchment especially difficult is that the general public is quite sympathetic to farmers and agricultural interests. As noted above, public support for the CAP is robust not just in France, but even in the Euro-skeptical UK. As Table 1.1 indicated a large majority of citizens believe that CAP spending is at the right level or too low and that the CAP benefits all citizens, not just farmers. Pierson notes that general support for welfare state retrenchment tends to dissipate when specific cuts are put on the table, but in the case of agriculture, there is no general consensus for retrenchment in the first place. Finally, there is the obvious political-institutional difference that countries set their own social policies, but Europe’s agricultural policy must be jointly agreed upon by multiple countries . The greatest hurdle is posed by the rules governing decision making that any reform must clear. For many years, EU agricultural reforms had to be agreed upon unanimously. The rules of Qualified Majority Voting, have been applied to CAP decision making since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1987. For a decision to pass, QMV requires assent from a group of countries that represent both a super-majority of countries and a super-majority of the entire Union’s population . This super majority voting system provides considerable opportunity for opposition and obstruction. Under the current rules of QMV, a blocking minority consisting of 4 countries that represent 35% of the population can prevent the passage of a proposal. The threshold for enacting cuts to the CAP is much higher than that for retrenching national welfare policies. While retrenching the social welfare state is generally considered to be difficult, a case can be made that retrenching the agricultural welfare state is even more challenging. Reformers must out manoeuver farmer organizations that are deeply embedded in the policy process. They must also navigate a public that is favorably disposed toward farmers. Finally, they must overcome the European Union’s complex decision making rules that provide a host of opportunities for thwarting change.The first part of my argument shows why CAP reform is so difficult.
Yet reform does happen at times. This section identifies the circumstances that make CAP reform possible. Moments of crisis may strengthen the hand of reformers. Pierson notes that welfare reformers often deploy or even manufacture crises and constraints to boost support for retrenchment. Globalization is claimed to force countries to cut social spending and taxes in order to remain competitive; deindustrialization and mass unemployment are said to necessitate reductions in labor costs and benefits in order to boost job creation in low-productivity services; European Monetary Union allegedly compels governments to slash spending in order to balance their budgets; and population aging is portrayed as mandating cuts in age-sensitive programs like pensions and health care. Crises and external pressures have also opened the door to agricultural retrenchment. International trade negotiations, enlargement, and environmental crises have all challenged the CAP. They have destabilized the status quo and created opportunities for proponents of far reaching change. These pressures are frequently cited in the literature about CAP reform. One group of scholars links the CAP reform process to GATT/WTO pressures . For these authors, episodes of CAP reform are presented as essentially driven by pressures related to a round of trade negotiations. In this school of thought, the time and content of CAP reform is shaped by the concurrent presence of trade negotiations. Other scholars cite budgetary concerns and the process of enlargement as driving CAP reform . As with the GATT/WTO line of argumentation, these authors evoke pressures related to budgetary restrictions and enlargement to both explain why CAP reform happens when it does and account for the contents of the final agreement. While the attention to these pressures is particularly helpful in identifying the factors that both precipitate reform and strengthen the position of the reformers, this literature is less compelling in explaining the ultimate content of the final CAP reform. More often than not, the final agreement differs greatly from the initial proposals, and the concerns related to external pressures are not always fully addressed. This approach, however, is quite useful for understanding when CAP reformers have the opportunity to press for broader, deeper reforms of the CAP. Building on this insight, I have developed a framework for determining the broader conditions under which CAP reform occurs and the implications of those conditions for reform. CAP reform and negotiations can be broadly categorized as falling under two sets of conditions. The first condition, which I refer to as “politics as usual”, characterizes those negotiations in which the primary pressures and concerns relate to day-to-day functioning and operation of the CAP in the EU under its present configuration. The main challenges and issues typically relate to spending and the budget, rural development, and the environment. Although bold and ambitious reform proposals are made, final agreements under politics as usual conditions tend to be underwhelming. Many of the proposals are defeated outright. Those that are not rejected are often made voluntary or watered down so significantly that the resulting policy has little impact on CAP operations. The second potential condition involves what I refer to as “disruptive politics”. Under this condition, reformers are not only concerned with the CAP itself , but must also consider the problems and consequences of the application of the CAP and its policies beyond the agricultural sector. Specifically, when negotiating the CAP in the context of disruptive politics, reforms are shaped by non-agricultural considerations, such as trade negotiations and enlargement. CAP reformers have considerably more success when they are able to expand the proposal’s scope, tying it to these broader issues. The reform success under “disruptive politics” tracks with what Baumgartner and Jones describe as “Schattschneiderian moments”. In Schattschneiderian moments, issues or policy proposals are reframed or repackaged so as to change the scope of conflict. Much like these moments, disruptive politics allows CAP reformers to reframe the policy under discussion by tying agricultural reform to a broader issue or challenge. By managing the scope of conflict and shifting the agenda CAP reformers have a greater chance of successfully pursuing far-reaching agricultural change.