We begin by introducing digital agriculture and the limited social scientific literature on the topic

With regard to demographic characteristics, two patterns are worth mentioning. First, farmers using all four improved technologies belong to households whose heads are significantly more educated than their counterparts. Second, household size is significantly larger among treated farmers. One possible explanation is the fact that larger households are more likely to have members engaged in non-farm income generating activities, and hence are able to bear the costs and the risk of adopting improved technologies.The use of tractor mechanization is significantly correlated with road infrastructure. The distance to the nearest tarred road is three times higher among households who did not use tractors, relative to their counterparts. Remarkably, among the 2 percent of the population that used a tractor, 49 percent accrues to Maputo province, and 32 percent to Gaza province, both located in the south, a region of relatively lower agricultural potential, but of better road infrastructure. The remaining 19 percent are distributed across the other 8 provinces, which includes agro-ecological zones of higher agricultural potential, but relatively poorer road infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, adoption rates rise with increases in both landholding size and livestock flocks for all four improved technologies. Households with larger landholdings will potentially have higher production and thus feel compelled to invest in improved granaries. The use of animal traction or tractor mechanization is also cost-effective in larger fields. Additionally, the adoption of animal traction and tractor mechanization require some initial investment, and asset endowment is positively and significantly correlated with household welfare. With regard to access to credit,bato bucket the difference between treated and untreated households was only significant for the adoption of tractor mechanization, and marginally significant for the use of animal traction. This result, however, is an artifact of a low data variation as not many households could access the emerging rural credit market.

Furthermore, a tractor can be used as collateral, a bottleneck for many rural households in accessing to the credit market. Membership to farmers’ association is also significantly correlated with the use of improved agricultural technologies. The number of farmers using tractor mechanization is three times higher among members of an association. Similarly, there are twice as many farmers using improved seeds among members of a farmers’ association.Figures 1A through 4A show the distribution of propensity scores for all four technologies. Treated and untreated households overlap very well, suggesting that the overlap assumption is plausible. Additionally, the assessment of the overlap assumption was complemented by the analysis of normalized differences. The results are presented in Table 2, and they show that normalized differences are in general smaller than 0.25 . Exceptions are the variables on head’s age and tropical livestock units. However, this outcome did not affect the estimation results because these two variables were dropped from the stepwise logit model due to their low explanatory power. The results on the stepwise logit model are not reported to save space, but are available from the author upon request.Table 4 presents the estimation results of the impact of selected improved agricultural technologies, contrasting the results obtained through three econometric approaches. With the exception of animal traction, the impact of improved agricultural technologies is consistently positive and significantly different zero. The impact is greater for tractor mechanization, followed by the use of improved seeds, and finally the use of improved granaries. Farmers that used animal traction and experienced losses in 2004/05 agricultural season may be enticed to abandon such technology, especially if they rented the animals and the implements. This is probably one of the reasons why “adoption rates” of improved agricultural technologies are usually very low: some farmers abandon the technology after some unsuccessful adoption attempts. Policies to sustain adoption of improved agricultural technologies should be put in place.

Irrigation investments fall in that category.The significance of improved granaries underscores the relevance of post-harvest losses, and reducing these losses potentially results in higher household income in light of opportunities for inter-temporal price arbitrage; and improved food entitlements and farmer’s nutritional status. The author speculates that the benefits from an improved granary might outstrip by far its construction costs, considering that it will be used for more than a year. The impact of improved seeds on maize is about 2 000 Meticais/ha, and 5 180 Meticais/ha for tractor mechanization . The estimates of the impact can also be regarded as shadow prices. Specifically, during the 2004/05 agricultural season, the use of tractor mechanization would be profitable for the farmer whenever the market cost of hiring a tractor was below $212/ha. Likewise, the market price of improved maize seeds required to sow 1 hectare of maize should be lower than $80. Taking into account that mean household income in 2004/05 was about $137 per adult equivalent , and that less than 5 percent had access to credit, understanding why adoption of improved technologies is extremely low becomes trivial. Even if improved agricultural technologies were riskless, a bulk of farmers would not be financially capable of investing in such technologies, much less irrigation. There is certainly an ample scope to enhance the impact of improved seeds and tractor mechanization, considering that less than 5 percent use irrigation or inorganic fertilizers, and about half of the tractors used in Mozambique are located in Maputo province, and more than 3/4 of all tractors are located in the south. If the Mozambican government wants to achieve the much talked-about green revolution, then huge investments on basic infrastructure and irrigation may pave the way for higher adoption rates and profitability of improved agricultural technologies. The bad news is that climate change and global warming is a translucent reality, potentially with severe implications to African agriculture. In the Mozambican agriculture context, the implication is that any effort to foster adoption of animal traction, improved seeds, tractors, and other improved technologies should be accompanied by investments on irrigation or water conservation technologies.

Furthermore, drought-tolerant improved seeds will also significantly increase both agricultural production and productivity amidst low irrigation use and recurrent drought spells across the country.Hundreds of reports and articles begin with a variation on the same apocalyptic exhortation: The combination of population growth, food price volatility, and climate change demands a new agricultural revolution to expand and secure the global food supply. The bio-technologies first deployed in the Green Revolution are still being constantly improved; food prices, however, stay stubbornly high and many fear a yield plateau. The new revolution, they argue, is digital technology. In a recent article about the use of artificial intelligence in agriculture, for example, Wired gushed about “an explosion in advanced agricultural technology, which Goldman Sachs predicts will raise crop yields 70 percent by 2050” . Goldman, for their part, estimate that digital agricultural technologies will become a $240 billion market by 2050 . X, Google’s “moonshot” venture, recently hailed the arrival of “the era of computational agriculture” . Traditional agribusinesses have found themselves competing with Silicon Valley giants, venture capitalists, scrappy startups, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations , and research institutions to develop and market a dizzying array of new technologies to feed “the next two billion” and save the world. “Digital agriculture” is a heterogeneous suite of information-rich, computationally-complex, and often capital-intensive methods for improving the efficiency of agricultural land and the profit margins of sectoral actors. Digital technologies have come to play a role in every stage of the agricultural cycle under capitalism, from input management to marketing produce, pricing commodities futures to pest control. However, while it is true that these technologies increase efficiency, we contest the notion that they will provide a long-term solution to the looming crises of the global food system. For what the narrative of an agricultural techno-revolution elides is how the methods of industrialized food production create these challenges in the first place. We interpret the rise of digital technologies in agriculture as the continuation of a process dating back to the Green Revolution, namely, to reconfigure agrarian life in a manner amenable to increased profits, especially for actors further up the value chain. For the proponents of digital agriculture, the transition is between two technologically-paved pathways to profit: innovations in high dimensional computing supersede innovations in breeding. A purely technological perspective is insufficient and depoliticizes analyses of far-reaching changes to agricultural production,dutch bucket hydroponic changes which have an effect on the rest of the capitalist economy . Nevertheless, this has not stopped digital agriculture’s boosters from frequently claiming that it heralds a “fourth agricultural revolution.”However, digital agriculture has received limited critical attention from social scientists. The vast majority of critical work on the ascendancy of global technology mega-firms and new information-centric accumulation strategies looks at their effects in non-agrarian industrial and service sectors. However, the generation of profits in these sectors depends in part on keeping inputs for production and reproduction— like food—artificially cheap . By perpetuating an unsustainable regime of cheap food, digital agriculture technologies support the continued expansion of an equally unsustainable global urban system.We argue that the rise of digital agriculture is emblematic of an intensifying relationship between zones of agrarian production and extraction on the one hand, and zones of agglomeration, industrial production, and service provision on the other.

A body of neo-Lefebvrian scholarship describes these apparently distinct zones as co-constitutive, entangled in a dialectic of extended and concentrated urbanization . In this framework, the growth imperative of capitalism requires the transformation of vast landscapes beyond the ‘city’ to increase extraction and agricultural output, the product of which is drawn back inward to fuel growth. In this reading, the sociol-metabolic process of urbanization is increasingly generalized, to the point that some have argued for thinking of contemporary urbanization as a ‘planetary’ process. With this in mind, this article interrogates the political economy of digital agriculture and reinterprets the digitalization of the food system through the lens of extended–concentrated urbanization.Next, we critique the mainstream rhetoric surrounding digital agriculture, which makes a Malthusian argument for the need to feed a burgeoning global population in the face of climate change. Then, beginning from the observation that the crucial role of information is under-analyzed in the extended–concentrated urbanization framework, we build a theoretical argument for how digital agriculture challenges the urban–rural binarism. We locate the framework’s origins as a reaction to earlier threads of globalization theory, which emphasized the supposedly immaterial nature and deterritorializing effects of information and communications technologies . The ‘urbanization of hinterland’ requires the ability to observe, interpret, and manage processes of extended urbanization from zones of concentration. We then “bring information back in” by introducing a more materialist analysis of the role of information in global capitalist space, which centers on computation capital: the infrastructure necessary to transport and make legible enormous amounts of data. In this framework, digital agriculture can be reinterpreted as a “data fix” for multiple entangled crisis tendencies of urbanization. These include the well-documented ecological crisis caused by industrialized agriculture—necessary to keep food prices, and therefore wages, low enough to generate profits in the traditionally ‘urban’ secondary and tertiary sectors—as well as a potential crisis of the over accumulation of computational capital. This crisis response, in turn, reconfigures the concentrated–extended dialectic of urbanization. The digitalization of agriculture further consolidates agrarian knowledge and decision-making away from the fields and among agribusiness and, newly, technology actors. We note how this of-siting transforms agrarian land tenure and deskills agricultural workers. This connects directly to the concept of ‘depeasantization’ , which can be understood as the mirror of urban agglomeration. We conclude with some suggestions for future research on digital agriculture’s effects on the urban/rural divide. The intensive use of information technologies in agriculture has received limited attention from social scientists. As recently as 2016, Bronson and Knezevic, in taking a critical look at how such tools affect the power dynamics between farmers and corporations, noted that “there has been no attention given to Big Data’s implications in the realm of food and agriculture” . In the years since, a steady trickle of publications has begun addressing this gap: on a “data grab” ; on the unequal ability between farmers and firms to use data ; on digital agriculture’s transformation of farmers into consumers ; on the racialized exploitation of labor ; on the embedded norms of digital agriculture ; and on alternatives .

This trend is caused by the drought years of the hydrologic period used for future projections

Food production, defined as the total yield of crops measured in tons, started at 3.4 million tons in 2000 for both scenarios, decreased to 1.9 million tons in 2009, and then increased to 2.9 million tons in 2015. For the future projections, from 2016 to 2020, the optimized scenario delivered more food than the baseline given the available land, but the baseline scenario showed steadily higher amounts of food production from 2022 to 2040 due to the fixed acreages and available water in that scenario. Food production decreased 8.5% under the optimization scenario.Groundwater has been over drafted in Pajaro Valley for decades . The modeling results from this study illustrate aquifer depletion, where 49 years of historical annual time series of inflows and outflows are estimated through a GBM and compared to PVHM . GBM results show an estimated annual average overdraft of −14.8 million m3=year from 1966 to 2009, close to the PVHM result of −15.9 million m3=year. Comparing the simulation models of GBM and PVHM has its limitations. GBM does not include certain inflows [landward underflow and stream flow infiltration, subtotal 17,930 thousands acre-ft ð TAFÞ=year on average] and outflows [storage flow depletion, storage depletion masked by seawater intrusion, outflows to the bay and tile drains, subtotal 18,910 TAF=year on average], which approximately cancel each other out. While these components contribute to the hydrology of the basin, GBM omits these components for simplification, and it represents a limitation of the model. The GBM was evaluated from 2016 to 2040 under two scenarios to estimate the average net groundwater storage of the area . Both scenarios began with an overall depletion of −57 million m3=year in 2015. This significant depletion of groundwater is related to the most recent multiyear drought in California that began in 2012,ebb flow tray which exacerbated the exploitation of groundwater resources because of the lack of groundwater regulations and policies in California before the passage of SGMA.

Both projections display similar behavior; however, the optimized scenario shows overall less groundwater depletion for the Pajaro Valley groundwater basin. The optimized scenario projects 10 years where the aquifer storage is zero or positive from 2020 to 2033. Both projections show the greatest depletion in 2040, with aquifer storage levels of −83 million m3=year and −48 million m3=year for the baseline and optimized scenarios, respectively.The highest storage point is 2 million m3 in 2033 and 35 million m3 in 2023 on the baseline and optimization scenarios, respectively. Overall, the GBM projections from 2016 to 2040 showed an average net groundwater depletion of −48 million m3=year for the baseline scenario in contrast with −10 million m3=year for the optimized scenario. This illustrates the possibility of a 79% increase in net groundwater storage from 2016 to 2040. Focusing on a shorter period from 2016 to 2030, the difference between projections is even greater with −47 million m3=year for the baseline scenario and −5 million m3=year for the optimization scenario, which is an 89% increase in net groundwater storage from 2016 to 2030. A single factor ANOVA evaluation indicated a significant difference in the net groundwater storage between scenarios. These findings support part of the study goal, which was that constraining agricultural water use can result in less groundwater overdraft. These results illustrate that groundwater simulation models can estimate future trends in groundwater depletion, consistent with previous studies in other agricultural and groundwater-dependent areas of California, while also validating the innovate application of optimization models to explore ecological and sustainable solutions to groundwater and land management challenges .

There are opportunities to improve water management in Pajaro Valley to reduce aquifer depletion and prioritize a reliable supply of freshwater for population demands and agriculture activities if farmers are incentivized to making collective decisions to optimize profits while managing groundwater sustainably.Successful productivity growth in agriculture has been the source of early development and subsequent structural transformation and industrialization in most of today’s high income countries. This has been amply documented by the work of historians such as Bairoch who analyzed at the Western industrialization experience, cascading from England in the mid- 1700s, to France and Germany around 1820, the United States and Russia in the mid-1800s, and finally Japan with restauration of the Meiji emperors in 1880. Following WWII, agriculture has similarly been the engine of growth and transformation for the Asian industrialization miracles in Taiwan, South Korea, China , and Vietnam . In all these countries, an agricultural revolution preceded a subsequent industrial take-off, typically by something like a half century. Agriculture has also fulfilled an important role in facilitating industrialization in countries like India, Brazil, and Chile . Agriculture remains today the expected engine of growth for the “agriculture-based countries”, those countries with a high contribution of agriculture to GDP growth and a high share of their poor in the rural sector . These are also countries where the farm population is importantly composed of smallholder farmers , in some cases exclusively and in others coexisting with larger commercial farms . In both cases, agricultural growth importantly requires modernization of the operation of SHFs. With labor-intensive industrialization increasingly compromised by robotization and the reshoring of industries toward the industrialized countries , agriculture with agroindustry and the associated linkages to services and non-tradable consumption has been heralded as a potentially effective strategy for GDP growth in these countries . This includes most of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries. This approach is a major departure from the classical structural transformation approach based on labor-intensive industrialization advocated in the dual economy models . The World Development Report Agriculture for Development’s main message was that agriculture-based countries should invest more in agriculture in order to fully capture its potential for growth and poverty reduction.

Following the world food crisis of 2008, there was a short-term positive response by governments, international organizations, and the donor community with a sharp increase in investment in agriculture. The number of countries meeting the CAADEP goal of allocating at least 10% of government expenditures to agriculture increased from 3 in 2007 to 10 in 2009. Overseas development assistance to agriculture increased by 60% between 2007 and 2009. But this response has not been sustained. In 2014 only 2 SSA countries out of 43 met the CAADEP goal. The modal SSA country spends only 5% of its public expenditures on agriculture. No SSA country spends a percentage of its public budget on agriculture that reaches the percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP, and 75% of the countries spend less than half that percentage . CAADEP also set a goal for public spending on agricultural Research-and-Development to reach 1% of agricultural GDP. Returns to investing in agricultural research are typically significantly in excess of cost relative to other public programs, indicating under-investment . This takes extreme forms in SSA where investment is by far the lowest among regions and has been declining over the last decade. In 2011, only six countries met the CAADEP research goal . With failure to invest in agriculture, the yield gap on cereals has continued to increase between SSA and other regions of the world. This gap is correlated with a growing chemical fertilizer gap and a large deficit in irrigation. Today, the World Development Report’s main message continues to be advocated by international development organizations such as the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development . This is motivated by the observation that 51% of the world extreme poor live in SSA, a share that continues to rise, and 78% of the world extreme poor work in agriculture in spite of rapid urbanization. Success in using Agriculture for Development is thus essential to meet the Sustainable Development Goals on poverty and hunger. In the current global economic context for the SSA countries,flood and drain tray investing in agriculture where the poor work has proven more effective for poverty reduction than taking the poor out of agriculture and to an urban-industrial environment through a Lewis -type structural transformation. Research shows that the poor are not found in agriculture due to adverse selection. Poverty reduction, where it has happened, has been more effective through productivity growth where the poor work than through structural transformation . A Solow-type decomposition of sources of growth shows that agricultural output growth in SSA in the 1985- 2012 period originated for 63% from area expansion compared to 8% from factor deepening and 29% from productivity growth . This is not sustainable due to an effective land constraint and declining farm size in most countries as a consequence of rapid population growth. Take Malawi as an example where agricultural land for households engaged in agricultural production fell from 2.3 acres in 2004, to 1.8 in 2010, and 1.4 in 2016 . Productivity growth and factor deepening consequently have to be the main sources of growth in SSA agriculture as in the rest of the developing world where they account for 83% of agricultural output growth.

This opinion on the role of agriculture for development is far from universally shared in the development community. Gollin et al. and Collier and Dercon have argued that rural poverty reduction has to come from employment creation in the urban-industrial environment and a structural transformation of the economy. As seen above, governments have correspondingly not invested public resources in agriculture to the recommended levels. Hence the puzzle in using agriculture for development is: why has the World Development Report/CAADEP recommendation not been followed? We argue here that it is because the mainly supply-side approach used for implementation has proved insufficiently effective, and needs to be complemented for this by a more explicit demand-side approach. There are African countries to look at for successful progress toward productivity growth in staple foods and a rural transformation . Chemical fertilizer use is overall low , but uneven across countries. The LSMS-ISA data show that the share of cultivating households using chemical fertilizer reaches 77% in Malawi, 56% in Ethiopia, and 41% in Nigeria, while remaining at 17% in Niger and Tanzania, and 3% in Uganda . Rural transformation is accompanied by land concentration in medium farms in countries like Kenya , Ghana , Tanzania , and Zambia . These farms are typically mechanized and owned by well-educated urban-based professionals who can be effective agents for technology adoption. These various success stories show that using agriculture for development can be done, but has not yet been sufficient to overcome aggregate rising gaps in yields between SSA and the rest of the world.While there has been limited success with raising public expenditures on agriculture, there has been considerable progress with data collection and with rigorous experimentation on how to promote the modernization of agriculture. We consequently know a lot more today about how to use agriculture for development than we did ten years ago, even though this knowledge has most often not been put into practice in the desirable form and to the desirable degree. It is consequently important to start by reviewing what we have learned. The main argument that has been used in support of the need for a structural transformation as the mechanism to grow and reduce poverty is that there is a large labor productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture . An important observation, however, based on the LSMS-ISA data for SSA is that while the gap in labor productivity per person per year between non-agriculture and agriculture is indeed large, the gap in labor productivity per hour worked is relatively small . In other words, when agricultural workers do work, their labor productivity is not very different from that of non-agricultural workers. What this suggests is that there is a deficit in work opportunities for agricultural vs. non-agricultural workers that creates an income gap between the two categories of workers. Because households engage in a multiplicity of sectoral activities, the relevant contrast in labor productivity is not between agriculture and non-agriculture, but between rural and urban households, with rural households typically principally engaged in agriculture. Looking at labor calendars for rural and urban households in Malawi in Figure 1, we see that weekly household hours worked are not different for rural and urban households at peak labor time, which corresponds to the planting season in December and January .

Recent initiatives in grain market reform also appear to be particularly encouraging

Despite the gains in market performance in recent years, WTO makes demands on China’s domestic agricultural markets. Domestic marketing policy response to the nation’s impending WTO accession has been substantial and will continue. Major changes are aimed at improving the efficiency of domestic market performance and minimizing the adverse shocks that may arise from external trade liberalization. Perhaps more than in any other sector, the reforms in cotton and grain markets that China agreed to in the final stages of China’s WTO negotiation clearly show that its leaders are using this opportunity to develop its health domestic agricultural market. The case of cotton presents a good example. In 1999, officials began experimenting in the North China Plain with marketing reforms for cotton, frequently considered the second most important strategic agricultural commodity . The reforms were aimed at improving cotton market performance by reducing market transaction costs, creating a market-oriented pricing mechanism, and integrating regional markets. The main policy measure sought to eliminate the current monopolized state-own cotton procurement and distribution system. In part reflecting the fact that informal markets had already been working for many years, the disruption to cotton markets after liberalization were almost non-existent. With a successful performance of this experimental reform, the liberalization policy was expanded substantially in 2000 and fully implemented in 2001. Domestically, over the past two decades state-owned grain traders have chronically performed poorly due to imperfect incentives and a number of taxing policy burdens. Although many companies have received considerable marketing subsidies,ebb flow bench the losses of these firms have always been a burden on the national leaders.

Moreover, although it had appeared reformers had solved this problem in the mid-1990s, retrenchments in agricultural policy created a situation in which many state-owned grain companies were still losing money in the late 1990s. Internationally, there were also concerns over several commonly executed policies that are now being addressed. For example, WTO negotiators expressed their opinion that China’s traditional ways of pricing agriculture were distorting. Others believe that the rights of state owned grain trading enterprises to procure commodities from farmers under special access rights give certain domestic firms unfair access and violates national treatment principles of WTO. Facing these pressures and concerns, China has launched a new set of reforms in the area of state grain marketing system in 2000. Building on past efforts to liberalize markets and continuing with the tradition of moving gradually, many believe that the measures included in this round are ultimately expected to have a defining influence on China’s grain markets in the years to come. As part of the first step, the restrictions on grain procurement for lower quality grains such as the early indica rice and maize in southern China, spring wheat in northern China, and all wheat in southern China were phased out in 2000. After the policy was set in place, any trader was allowed to buy or sell grain from any farmer or other trader at any time. Almost immediately this policy resulted in an adjustment in the structure of the cropping patterns in some regions. In the last several years, producers have begun planting varieties to improve grain quality. Many of these improvement will mean that to some extent China’s farmers are in a more competitive position to produce and sell varieties that might otherwise come in from foreign sources, for example, high quality rice from Thailand or high quality wheat from Canada or the US. With successful performance of grain “varietal” reform in 2000, leaders are now going to officially liberalize grain markets. Depending on the deregulation of all grain-related procurement and sales, leaders are first implementing their policies in a subset of grain-deficit, coastal provinces, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. Currently, the government is planning to extend the implementation of the policies in all grain deficit provinces in 2002.

As seen in the past, given such close ties between traders in surplus and deficit areas, such policies in deficit areas will almost certainly naturally envelope all of China. In response to WTO accession, the government also have ambitious plans to increase investment in market infrastructure. Leaders see a need to establish an effective national marketing information network. Officials in the ministry of agriculture are attempting to standardize agricultural product quality and promote farm marketing. Some also have advocated the creation of agricultural technology associations. More generally, all of these moves are part of an effort by leaders to shift fiscal resources that used to be used to support China’s expensive price subsidization schemes to productivity-enhancing investments and marketing infrastructure improvements. The magnitude of this policy response is highlighted by the fact that the total subsidies for price and market interventions reached 40.3 billion in 2000, about 4 percent of national fiscal budget, more than any components of government expenditure in agricultural and rural area of bureaucrats that manage China’s agricultural policies, 93 billion on integrated agricultural development program, and 12.3 billion on poverty alleviation–CNSB, 2001. While not all of these funds were being used on distorting policies or non-productive administration, much of it was. If a good part of the funds is able to be redirected into more productive areas, there is a chance that the agricultural sector can be energized by this new windfall. The policy implications of China’s WTO accession on land use and farm organization also are hotly debated. Many of the concerns have arisen over the ability of China’s small farms to be able to compete after trade liberalization. Although every farm household in China is endowed with land, the average farm size is small, and declining . Leaders are pleased with the equity effects of the nation’s distribution of land as it allays concerns about food security and poverty. Land fragmentation and the extremely small scale of farms, however, almost certainly will in some way constrain the growth of labor productivity on the farm and hold back farm income.

The debate has centered on these issues: Some argue that farm size could be expanded and agricultural productivity could rise if policy makers were to advocate more secure land tenure arrangements. Others call for a continuation of policies that allow localities to periodically re-allocated land to the farmers in order to keep land in the hands of all rural residents. Although most policy makers currently seem to favor more secure rights, they still are searching for complementary measures that will not forego all of the pro-equity benefits of the current land management regime. Land ownership in rural areas, by law, is collectively owned by the village or small group and contracted to households . One of the most important changes in recent years has been that the duration of the use contract was extended from 15 to 30 years. By 2000, about 98% of villages had amended their contract with farmers to reflect the longer set of use rights . Although some were concerned that household and village demographics and other policy pressures often induce local authorities to reallocate land prior to contract expiration, it has been shown that the area of this reallocated land has been minimal and the effect on investment behavior insignificant . With the issue of use rights, resolved, the government is now searching for a mechanism that permits the remaining full-time farmers to gain access additional cultivated land and increase their income and competitiveness. One of the main efforts revolves around the development of a new Rural Land Contract Law. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has drafted a law and the main body is expected to approve it in the near future. According to this law, although the property rights over the ownership of the land remains with the collective, the Law conveys almost all other rights to the contract holder that they would have under a private property system. In particular, the Law clarifies the rights for transfer and exchange of the contracted land, an element that may already be taking effect as researchers are finding increasing more land in China is rented in and out . The new legislation also allows farmers to use contracted land for collateral to secure commercial loan. Part of the law also allows family members to inherit the land during the contracted period. The goal of this new set of policies is to encourage farmers to use their land to increase their farms and household short and long-run productivity. Although quite controversial,4x8ft rolling benches the effort to increase China’s agricultural productivity under trade liberalization also is made through the promotion of large farm enterprises. Many officials in the MOA consider this effort as one of important forces that may help to restructuring China’s agriculture, expand agricultural markets, and increase farmer income. Recently fiscal authorities have supported this effort by making grants and allowing tax reductions for the infrastructure investments of the farms. They also have provided large farms with credit subsidies for input procurement and the financing of their efforts to update their technology at all levels of the food change . As a result of China’s WTO accession, the support in this area is expected to increase. However, more effort in the future is likely to shift to supplying services that are supposed to be provided by government in areas such as farm infrastructure development, technology adoption, and extension, rather than direct intervention and subsidy. As subsidies through agricultural investment and inputs in China are subject to WTO restrictions on Aggregate Market Support , it is not expected that the extent of these subsidies will restrict such support. China will be limited to its support of large farms to levels that do not exceed its de minimis level of AMS of 8.5%.

However, it is much more likely that its ability to finance agricultural subsidies will be more binding than the WTO-imposed rules. The other major attempt to increase farm productivity and agricultural competitiveness under trade liberalization is to promote the development of farmer organizations. The government has now officially cast its support for self-organized farmer groups that focus agricultural technology and marketing . At one time, the creation of farmer organization was a political sensitive issue. Leaders were concerned with the rise of any organization outside the government’s authority. Such restrictions, however, caused a dilemma in reforming the nation’s agricultural and rural economies. Policy makers also are aware that with the small scale of China’s farms there are many increases in economic efficiency that might be gained by the creation of effective rural organizations and that if they were successful in raising incomes, there might be a rise in political stability.It is on this basis, then, that leaders have now decided to allow the organization of China’s 240 million farms. Letting these millions of small farmers competing in a market with globalization requires substantial institutional reforms on farm organization and provisions of government service such as technology extension and marketing information and quality controls. It will be in these areas that farmer organizations will be encouraged. In addition, these types of farm organizations that are supported by the government fall under WTO’s “Green Box” categorization and investments to create such groups will not be counted as part of the nation’s AMS measures. Perhaps more than anything, the government is going to need these farmer organizations to lead the fight against the imposition of trade barriers on China’s agricultural exports. Because China’s producers have not been organized, when foreign countries, such as Japan, Korea, and the US have levied trade barriers, typically citing dumping. Even when such cases were based on questionable bases, China had no one who had an incentive or ability to contest the cases. Since China Provisions of anti-dumping and safeguards measures against China’s products, such cases will not abate and the nation needs to have a way to protect the interest of those seeking to export.The financial sector has reformed more slowly than some other sector, and government maintains strong control . Among the commitments regarding the banking sector, the Protocol requires China to open the country’s financial markets in a step by step way. The liberalization must allow foreign competition across wider and wider regions and customer base. After a four years transition period, all regional restrictions will be removed and foreign banks will receive national non-discriminative treatment in the area of banking services. Specifically, restrictions on branch banking can not be imposed.

Each block has an agricultural office that is led by a Block Agricultural Officer

None of these studies consider whether engaging the supply side of the market can increase adoption by farmers. Survey data in agriculture suggest that input suppliers act as the second most popular source of information for Indian farmers. Informing private input suppliers about technological benefits is one way to take advantage of their intrinsic motivation to spread information. Yet, it has not been looked at as source of potential information agents with well-aligned incentives in promoting the adoption of new technologies. Our paper is the first to implement and test this as a new approach to doing agricultural extension.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives more background information on the setting and outlines the experiment. Section 3 describes the data collection. Section 4 presents the main results on how targeting agricultural extension to input dealers increases technology adoption by farmers, particularly those with the highest potential benefit. Section 5 turns to analyzing a potential explanation for this result. Particularly, it focuses on whether dealers spread information to their customers and what motivates them to do so. Section 6 concludes. This section starts by providing background information on the standard methods used in agricultural extension. It also gives a description of how the public sector delivers information to farmers in our particular study area. We then outline the design of our main experiment to compare these standard methods with the more business-oriented approach of using agrodealers as information agents. Governments all over the world support agricultural extension services as a mode of information delivery. Ministries of agriculture typically have entire departments dedicated to providing these services. These departments oversee local administrative offices that hire front line extension agents whose role is to diffuse information about new agricultural technologies and practices to farmers.

The specific techniques used by agents vary across contexts, but the basic methods are largely consistent,indoor garden especially in poor countries. Agents usually work with selected “contact farmers” who are keen on trying new approaches and are ideally able to transmit knowledge to others in their social networks. They also organize farmer field days with cluster demonstration plots, where new seeds are grown by multiple farmers, to boost the diffusion of information. The public sector provides agricultural extension services for at least two reasons. First, markets do not exist for many new innovations. For instance, a new planting method may only be promoted by government agents because there is no scope for profiting from its sale in private markets. This contrasts with new seed varieties or material inputs that are produced and sometimes marketed by private firms. Second, many agricultural innovations are not developed, and hence not marketed, by private firms. Public entities such as national agricultural research systems or international research organizations frequently develop new seeds, inputs, and agricultural management practices. The public extension service then transmits information about these developments to farmers. In the context of our experiment, agricultural extension workers use many of these standard techniques. Each of the 10 districts in the sample is organized into blocks, where a block has an average of 135 villages.The BAO employs Assistant Agricultural Officers and Village Agricultural Workers who work in the field with farmers. Our sample consists of 72 blocks in 10 flood-prone districts of Odisha.We selected these areas because the technology being promoted — a flood-tolerant rice variety called Swarna-Sub1 — is most suitable for flood-affected areas.

The blocks in the sample represent around 20 percent of the blocks in the state. We randomly assigned 36 of these blocks to the treatment group where agrodealers were targeted to receive seeds and information. This randomization was stratified by district. The remaining 36 blocks serve as a comparison group where we supported the government extension service to carry out normal extension activities. Figure 1 displays the timeline of these interventions. Starting in May 2016 — about 6-8 weeks before planting time — we partnered with the government’s extension service to introduce Swarna-Sub1 into control blocks. We did this in a way that mirrors three common practices in agricultural extension. First, field staff provided 10 seed minikits of 5 kilograms each to the BAO, who then helped identify contact farmers to use the kits. The BAO chose 2 villages and 5 farmers in each village. Each kit contained only seeds for testing and some basic information about Swarna-Sub1. Our field staff then delivered the kits to the recommended farmers. Second, we provided another 150 kg of seeds to the BAO so that he could set up a cluster demonstration where the seeds would be used by several farmers on a contiguous set of plots. Based on seeding rates in the region, 150 kg allows for cultivation of 5-10 acres. The BAO chose where to do the demonstration and which farmers to target. Official government guidelines for organizing these clusters suggest that they be carried out in sites that are easily accessible to be viewed by many farmers. Moreover, sites should be representative of average conditions in the area. Third, we helped the BAO carry out a farmer field day in November — at the time right before harvest. The BAO selected the location of the field day and whom to invite. The purpose of the field day was for extension staff to train farmers about Swarna-Sub1, share information from the demonstrations, and hope that information will spread throughout the block. The objective of such an active control group is twofold. First, it ensures that each block is endowed with the same quantity of seeds. Therefore, the dealer-based treatment only differs on who received the new seeds and information. Second, the demonstrations and partnerships with contact farmers may not have taken place without our involvement. Forcing these activities to happen makes the treatment-control comparison more meaningful. Most importantly, it sets a higher bar for the dealer-based treatment by eliminating any possibility that the new technology would not be promoted by the government extension service.

Turning to the 36 treatment blocks, we obtained a list of 2,087 seed suppliers from the state Department of Agriculture. These include suppliers of two types: private seed dealers and Primary Agricultural Cooperative Societies . PACS are farmer groups that handle credit, seed supply, and procurement of output for farmers. We did not include them in the intervention because their incentives are not the same as those of private dealers. Seed sales are usually handled by a member that is not the residual claimant on any profits from the sale. Despite being fewer in number relative to PACS, private dealers account for almost 60 percent of the seeds sold to farmers. The sample consists of 666 private dealers, 327 of which were located in the treatment blocks. Armed with this list, our field staff entered each treatment block and located five dealers interested in receiving seed minikits and an informational pamphlet about SwarnaSub1. In some blocks fewer than 5 dealers were available. We provided additional seed to each dealer in these cases to guarantee that a full 200 kilograms were introduced. The list provided by the Department of Agriculture did not have enough locatable dealers in some cases. In these circumstances, our field staff provided the seeds to other local agrodealers.Overall, seeds and information were provided to 151 dealers across the 36 treatment blocks.119 of these were from the original list. Once provided with seeds and information, the dealers were left alone to decide how to use them. We asked dealers about their intended uses. They overwhelmingly stated that they would use the seeds for testing on their own farms and would provide them to good customers for testing.Our intervention did not include any additional assistance to dealers. This differs from standard methods in agricultural extension where agents continually revisit their contact farmers. We allowed dealers to learn on their own because in theory they should be motivated to learn about a new product that could enhance their business. The goal of our treatment is to measure whether this motivation causes information to flow to farmers and ultimately increases adoption. Not intervening further ensures that our treatment effect is driven by any real-world incentives dealers have to learn, rather than heavy monitoring by our partners. Dealers in our sample are small business entrepreneurs. Some operate out of their homes, while others maintain shops in rural towns. 44 percent of dealers sell only seeds,hydroponic farming with fertilizers and pesticides being the most common inputs sold by the other dealers. Dealers are highly local. The median dealer sells enough rice seed to cover roughly 400 acres, which amounts to the rice area cultivated by 150 farmers.Importantly, dealers tend to serve the same customers from year to year. Another important feature of our context is that 84% of the seeds sold by dealers in our sample are produced by the state-run Odisha State Seed Corporation . Government subsidies explain this. Seeds produced by the state are subsidized at a rate of approximately 40 percent. No subsidies exist for seeds produced by private companies. As licensed agents, dealers receive a fixed commission that amounts to about 8 percent of the pre-subsidy price. All varieties have the same final price for farmers. Thus, the margin for dealers is the same across all types of varieties. Hence dealers have no direct financial incentive to sell one variety over another. Turning to the second season , we ran an SMS messaging experiment to compare our intervention with this “lighter touch” information treatment.

The random delivery of SMS messages allows us to test whether our dealer treatment substitutes basic knowledge that can be easily transmitted via ICT technology. Furthermore, it allows us to compare the direct effects of the two approaches. The messaging was simple. It informed farmers that Swarna-Sub1 is a new variety that is suitable for medium-low land in terms of elevation, matures in 145 days, and can tolerate up to two weeks of flooding. The message also stated that it was being produced by OSSC and could be available at local dealers. As a sampling frame, we obtained mobile numbers for 75,616 farmers that had registered for the state government’s Direct Benefit Transfer scheme to obtain seed subsidies.These farmers are located across the 261 gram panchayats that cover our main estimation sample, as outlined below. The SMS treatment was randomized at the gram panchayat level, resulting in messages being delivered to 37,783 of the names on the list.We anticipated that dealers and contact farmers would use the demonstration minikits for learning in 2016 and any possible treatment effects could first be detected during year two . Our main followup survey therefore took place in August-September 2017 — around 15 months after the interventions. Its purpose was to measure adoption of seed varieties by rice farmers. To minimize measurement error, we timed the survey to be right after planting. Our sample consists of 7,200 farmers. These farmers were drawn from a random sample of 261 gram panchayats — an administrative unit usually consisting of around 8 villages.Before drawing this sample, we excluded gram panchayats that had any village within 1.5 kilometers of the block boundary.We removed these areas to reduce any interference caused by farmers possibly obtaining seeds from other blocks. The 261 sample gram panchayats had 75,616 farmers registered for the DBT program for seed subsidies. Using this database as a sampling frame, we randomly drew 100 farmers from each block . These farmers are spread across 1,333 villages. Figure A1 shows their geographic dispersion across the 10 districts in the experiment. Survey teams succeeded in locating and surveying 6,653 of the farmers. Of these, 93 percent were currently cultivating rice. Table A1 shows no significant differences in the probabilities of being surveyed or growing rice between treatment and control groups. The survey focused on which seed varieties were currently being used for rice cultivation. Surveyors went through a list of 30 varieties and asked farmers which ones they were currently using and the amount of land being grown.In addition to these adoption data, we obtained information on contacts with agricultural extension agents during the last year, topics discussed during these conversations, whether the farmer had seen any seed demonstrations, and whether they had recently learned about Swarna-Sub1.

Relations between the indigenous and refugee varied from friendly to outright hostile

Those with no money whatsoever were given an allowance and low interest loans subsidized by SOPRO, and housing that the society had leased provided the refugees with much needed shelter. Society funds also paid for the establishment of a twenty-bed hospital and a small home and kindergarten for the children in the capital city. To the southeast of the capital, in the city of Cochabamba, elevation 8,500 feet, SORPRO established a home for the elderly and a sanatorium for those seeking relief from the extreme altitude of the capital.Agricultural training centers were set up to teach refugees the rudiments of farming in a semitropical and tropical environment. Many had no notion of what it meant to work the land; their ranks were filled with professionals such as chemists, engineers, lawyers and physicians. Indeed, in a letter to Hochschild, the Joint’s Paul Baerwald emphasized the importance of success, yet Baerwald also had his deep-seated doubts. “Jewish farm settlement is a much more difficult problem than settlement of peasants.” The Jewish refugee needed both acclimatization and ‘psycho-physiological retraining and readjustment’ Baerwald emphasized. Indeed, besides acclimatizing, one also had to acculturate to a largely indigenous populace, people whose customs and food were exotic in the extreme.There existed elements of the Bolivian population who viewed the newcomers as trespassers who took work from the native, that the displaced refugee was creating the displaced native. Yet there were those who also proffered the hand of friendship in the dynamic relationship between foreigner and native. However, cordial relationships between the refugee and the native could not make up for the shortcomings of the settlement plan. The scholar León E. Bieber lists the factors that led to the abandonment of Buena Tierra,plant benches and notes that a combination of reasons was responsible for its ultimate failure. Among them were the “negligencia en la selección de los inmigrantes.” Many ofthe refugees were professionals, and during the interview process had lied about their backgrounds and level of experience as farmers.

The pressure to escape the Nazis and save one’s life was just too much; hence there were physicians, engineers and other professionals who had falsely claimed an agricultural background. Other key reasons that Bieber noted were the “factores topográficos, la calidad de las tierras, la precaria estructura vial boliviana y la falta de adecuado apoyo.” The sheer isolation of Buena Tierra and the Yungas was due to a paucity of roads and railroad lines into the region. Had this transportation network infrastructure been in place, Buena Tierra may have prospered.The quality of the land and soil at Buena Tierra was hyped by the agronomist Bonoli, who, it turned out, “was profoundly mistaken.”Bieber cited the lack of sufficient government help as another factor that contributed to Buena Tierra’s demise. To achieve success it was essential to have, besides aid from Jewish philanthropies, the full support of the Bolivian Government. Finally, most of the refugees viewed Buena Tierra, and the host country Bolivia, as a stepping stone to other, more enticing locales such as the United States or Argentina, two American countries with thriving Jewish communities. We can debate the failure of the ‘experiments’ at Sosúa and Buena Tierra, yet there was for sure relative success. Both colonies were founded as places of refuge for thousands of involuntary emigrants fleeing the violence of their homeland. The fact that some refugees were able to escape the Nazi death-grip and begin life anew as farmers in distant lands underscores that very success. In retrospect, both projects had achieved their original goal of saving lives, and have left a model from which one may draw conclusions regarding their failure or a success. The model of agricultural settlement that Rosen successfully used for the Ukraine and Crimea, proved to be difficult to transfer to Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In spite of Rosen’s agronomist background, Rosenberg’s well-placed connections and professional experience as a lawyer, Hochschild’s wealth, and the help of the military man and Bolivian president Germán Busch, the success of these Jewish agricultural colonies was never assured. It all came down to the individual efforts of a few hardy souls and the collective will of many others behind the scenes. Although the same development model was used among the settlements discussed herein, it is clear that what had worked at one site failed miserably at others.

Competent administration, experimentation with different crops, a willing and able work force, along with the use of cutting-edge technology did not, by any stretch of the imagination, guarantee success. A fascist megalomaniac, a couple of third world dictators, a beloved U.S. President, a Jewish mining magnate and a cast of others, made for some very strange bedfellows indeed. Remove one of these historic figures from the equation, and neither Sosúa nor Buena Tierra would have seen the light of day.As human-converted habitats expand over Earth’s surface, the fate of global biodiversity will depend increasingly on the quality and characteristics of farming landscapes . Agricultural systems vary widely in their ability to support biodiversity, with many species extirpated from some but sustained in others . Additionally, characteristics of the species themselves, evolved over millions of years, may predispose some lineages to benefit from human environmental impacts . Phylogenetic diversity, the total evolutionary history or phylogenetic branch lengths of all species in a community , is recognized as having intrinsic conservation value . Also, ecological experiments in small plots indicate that communities with more phylogenetic diversity are more stable , possess higher productivity , and support more species at other trophic levels . Despite the known impact of agriculture on species loss, how habitat conversion affects phylogenetic diversity remains unknown. Studies of plants and invertebrates have established that local environmental disturbances favor subsets of closely related clades and often result in phylogenetic diversity loss . Further, some studies that examine the global extinction risk of birds and mammals suggest that particular branches of the tree of life are at greater risk than others , although whether evolutionarily distinct species are more at risk than species with many living relatives remains contested . We quantified changes in phylogenetic diversity across multiple landscapes in Costa Rica, combining a recent complete avian phylogeny with temporally and spatially extensive tropical bird censuses to assess how habitat conversion is restructuring the avian phylogeny . The data set comprised 44 transects, surveyed in wet and dry seasons over 12 years across four regions in two biomes .

Transects were located in three land-use types: forest reserves, diversified agricultural systems, and intensive mono cultures. Compared with intensive mono cultures, diversified agricultural systems had more crop types, complex configurations of vegetation, and substantial surrounding tree cover . Our analysis focused on three unresolved questions. First, do certain bird clades thrive in agriculture, or is this capacity broadly distributed across the tree of life? Second, how much phylogenetic diversity is lost when native forest is replaced with agriculture? Last, are evolutionarily distinct species capable of persisting in agriculture? We found that clades from across the bird phylogeny thrived in agriculture . Affinity for different habitats showed phylogenetic signal, meaning that closely related species were more likely to share habitat preferences than species that were distantly related . The phylogenetic signal was best described by using Pagel’s lambda transformation of the phylogeny , which reduces the degree of correlation of traits between species below the Brownian motion expectation . Although most taxonomic families had species associated with all habitat types, some families tended to affiliate with particular habitats. For example, pigeons, seedeaters, swallows, and blackbirds were agriculture-affiliated,rolling bench whereas trogons, antbirds, ovenbirds, and manakins were forest-affiliated . Despite the variety of lineages that were found in agriculture, average within transect phylogenetic diversity was 40% lower in intensive mono cultures than in forest reserves and 15% lower in diversified agricultural systems than in forest reserves . Across all transects and years, forest reserves, diversified agricultural systems, and intensive mono cultures housed 4.10, 3.85, and 3.26 billion years of evolutionary history. Two processes were responsible for changes in phylogenetic diversity: species loss and increasing species relatedness. We found roughly the same number of bird species in diversified agricultural systems as in forest reserves [N = 62 species; likelihood ratio test P = 0.75] but half as many species in intensive mono cultures . However, species loss alone did not account for declining phylogenetic diversity in agriculture . Species in forest reserves were less related to one another than expected by chance, whereas species in diversified agricultural systems and intensive mono cultures were more closely related . These patterns indicate that phylogenetic diversity loss in agriculture occurs in two steps. First,habitat conversion from forest to diversified agricultural systems causes a shift in community composition while maintaining species richness: Agricultural species are not nested subsets of forest species . Because species in diversified agricultural communities are closely related, this shift results in a moderate decline in phylogenetic diversity within a transect. Then, as agricultural practices intensify, species loss from this agricultural bird community causes another more-substantial decline in phylogenetic diversity. Whether phylogenetic diversity loss will substantially reshape the global tree of life depends on the capability of species from evolutionarily distinct lineages to persist in agricultural lands. We quantified each species’ evolutionary distinctness as its contribution to the phylogenetic diversity of the world’s 9993 bird species . Species in forest reserves had slightly greater average evolutionary distinctness than those in diversified agricultural systems or intensive mono cultures . This pattern did not result from a small number of highly distinct, forest affiliated species—repeating the analysis after removing the top 10% most distinct species did not alter results .

Conversely, communities in intensive mono cultures hosted younger species with more-rapid diversification rates  . At the species level after accounting for phylogenetic covariance, DR was negatively correlated with forest affiliation and positively correlated with affinity for diversified agricultural systems . To explore how habitat conversion affects the temporal population dynamics and local extirpation risks of evolutionarily distinct species, we developed a temporal, multi-species, hierarchical occupancy model that accounted for detection bias . The model provided a dynamic assessment of which species were extirpated from and/or recolonized sites at the greatest rates from year to year . Extirpation was estimated as the probability that a species did not persist from one year to the next, whereas colonization was the probability that a species was absent one year but present the next. We modeled occupancy dynamics over 12 years, validating our model through examining dry and wet season surveys separately. We found that extirpation probability was highest in intensive mono cultures and lowest in forest reserves . More evolutionarily distinct species experienced higher extirpation rates than less-distinct species in both diversified agricultural systems and intensive mono cultures. Evolutionarily distinct species fared worst in intensive mono cultures, where the top 10% most distinct species experienced extirpation rates ~two times greater than in diversified agricultural systems. Between-year colonization probabilities were low in all land-use types, but evolutionarily distinct species colonized both diversified agricultural systems and intensive mono cultures less frequently than less-distinct species . Repeating analyses at the genus level confirmed that the results were not driven by a few clades. These findings suggest that, over time, evolutionarily distinct species will face challenges in maintaining populations in agricultural systems, especially in intensive mono cultures. We offer two possible explanations for why evolutionarily distinct species and phylogenetic diversity should decline in agriculture. First, species that today inhabit tropical agriculture may have evolved primarily in open habitats, such as grasslands. During geologically recent periods of glaciation when open grassland habitats in the Neotropics proliferated , several clades may have undergone increased speciation , leading to the enrichment of younger species in agriculture . Indeed, we found that species that use natural open habitats were more likely to thrive in agriculture . However, whereas species associated with savannas had slightly higher diversification rates than other species , there were no consistent differences in diversification rates between species that use natural open habitats and those that do not . Another explanation is that birds in agriculture represent a novel community.

The recruitment of refugees with an agricultural background proved to be almost impossible

Meanwhile, the proposals to consolidate oversight and implement regulations in a clear way will accommodate smaller firms and researchers, who do not have legal staff or experience with handling federal regulations. These stakeholders will face lower financial and time constraints.With a clearer and more streamlined process, the US will see a proliferation of GE crops. Small to mid-sized innovators may find niche markets in editing crops that lag in breeding efficiency. These benefits will be particularly fruitful for specialty crops like grapes, almonds, and pistachios that are ripe for rapid advancements. The US agricultural sector also awaits innovations that will increase adaptation to the worsening threats of climate change such as fire, drought, and flooding. If federal policy keeps up with these advancements by streamlining and demystifying regulations, the United States will benefit from crops that are safer, cheaper, and more resilient.Although Jewish agricultural settlements have had a long history in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, those founded as a result of the panic emigration out of Europe on the heels of World War II are unique. Never before in the history of mankind had the leaders of thirty two nations gathered together in one location to collectively discuss the fate of countless Jewish people. Indeed, the 1938 International Conference at Évian-les-Bains in France, would give rise to the idea of having Jewish refugees settle as agricultural pioneers in lands distant from the turmoil that unfolded in Europe. Jewish refugees were given the opportunity to start life anew as agriculturalists, an occupation most unfamiliar to the Jew, who was, in the main, an urbanized professional or skilled craftsman. Torn from the relative comfort of their European homes by hostile Germans,low round pots the refugees attempted to build a new existence under the protection of host countries such as Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.

The success, or failure, of the refugee colonies of Sosúa in the Dominican Republic and Buena Tierra in Bolivia, is still being debated today, more than a half-century after their establishment, and in some ways provides a model for contemporary studies of similar crises that are currently unfolding in Africa and the Middle East. The property at Sosúa amounted to 26, 000 plus acres that had been abandoned by its former owners, the United Fruit Company, or the UFC. During its time in the hands of the international company, the lands were part of a larger banana plantation, and through the dealings of the Dominican dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina; the massive property had become part of his vast business empire. It had some basic infrastructure that had been built for the UFC’s operations, which included some outbuildings and “over twenty houses, miles of fencing, some electricity, a few roads, and some running water, including a 50,000 gallon reservoir.”There were the remnants of a pier that the U.F.C. had built to ship the bananas that it had, with moderate success, grown in the shallow soil at Sosúa. The property sported incredible views of the blue Caribbean just beyond a crescent-shaped, pristine white sand beach that stretched for about eight miles along the coast and inland for seven miles framing Sosúa Bay. Its waters, being mostly calm year round, were a most welcome sight and an invitation to take advantage of the diversions that ocean sports offered. One could take a leisurely stroll down one of the paths to the beach, take a pleasant dive or swim, and even fish within Sosúa Bay’s placid waters. Indeed, there would be settlers who disdained farm work and spent the bulk of their time enjoying the warm tropical weather sunbathing at Sosúa beach. Joseph Rosen and others of his team had scoured the island looking for appropriate properties on which to resettle the refugees. Some of the properties that Rosen’s team had surveyed proved to be less than desirable; however, the Sosúa tract held some promise.

It had some cultivable land that the UFC had previously utilized as a banana plantation, and some very basic infrastructure. The American analysts, under Rosen’s direction “explored lands, half of which Trujillo owned, that Dominican officials offered for settlement [that was] suitable for settlement of more than 28,000 families. Because of the difficulties of starting new settlements and uncertainties about which crops settlers would produce, they recommended starting with a modest pilot project.” Among the scholars who have written about Sosúa, there exist slight discrepancies in the data including the size of the plot. Some scholars such as Bruman listed the size of the settlement at 27,000 acres, while others such as Kaplan and Wells have pegged the acreage at 26,000. For the sake of consistency we use the figure of 26,000 acres because it is the figure most often used. Joseph Rosen’s analysts had, in all probability, located better plots for the establishment of refugee settlements, however, the sway of Trujillo, and the fact that he had ownership of the Sosúa property, dictated that Rosen choose Sosúa as the site for the Republic’s first agricultural settlement of Jewish political refugees. The Sosúa site proved to have just a fraction of its land fit for cultivation. It had rocky outcrops and a lack of water, two obstacles to be dealt with should the settlement thrive. James Rosenburg, Rosen’s partner and the president of DORSA, incorporated in New York in December 1939, negotiated with Trujillo for the property. DORSA had as its mission the financing of the Jewish settlement at Sosúa. Together with other Jewish philanthropies such as the Joint, and the Agro-Joint, or the American Jewish Joint Agricultural Organization, DORSA collected funds and made studies of possible settlement sites. Rosenburg did not want to accept the property as a gift from Trujillo, insisting instead on purchasing it. The dictator claimed that he purchased the property from the United Fruit Company after the company had abandoned the former banana plantation. “Trujillo had allegedly bought the land from the United Fruit Company. He maintained that it had cost him $56,000…that he had put another $10,000 into it, but offered the land with buildings on any terms.”

The historian Allen Wells, in his monograph Tropical Zion, General Trujillo, F.D.R., and the Jews of Sosúa, has stated that Trujillo had purchased the property from the U.F.C. for the modest sum of $50,000. The international company had sold the property to Trujillo “in appreciation for the protection he afforded when he was head of the army.”However, Trujillo had no intention of turning the plot into agricultural land and looked to turning Sosúa into a cattle ranch.According to Metz, “Trujillo had originally obtained the lands that were to become Sosúa in an “irregular way.’ The foreign impression was that he donated lands to Jews at Sosúa, whereas, according to the ‘Dominican version,’ Trujillo had inexpensively purchased the properties under United Fruit Company pressure and then sold them at a significant profit in cash and stock to DORSA. What is certain is that Trujillo collected from DORSA one million dollars for this land.”However, in a letter from James Rosenberg addressed to ‘His Excellency, Rafael L. Trujillo’, dated June 25, 1951, more than a decade after its founding, Rosenberg gave thanks to the President for the gift of land at Sosúa. “Never, as long as I live, will I forget the day when I received your letter at Sosúa in which you gave our Association your land now occupied by the settlers. Faithfully yours, James N. Rosenberg.”This is not the first reference that Rosenberg makes regarding the Sosúa lands as being a gift from Trujillo to DORSA. In another piece of correspondence from Rosenberg to ‘His Excellency, Generalíssimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic’ and dated February 8, 1957, Rosenberg praised Trujillo for his “noble gift of the Sosúa property.”The friendship that developed between Rosenberg and Trujillo began much earlier, as is evidenced in a letter to Trujillo from Rosenberg dated May 20, 1940, almost two years after the international conference at Évian les Bains. Rosenberg addressed Trujillo as “My Dear Generalíssimo,” and thanked him for “your service to the cause of humanity in these dark and tragic hours.”The two men were to become more than just collaborators; they became close friends and looked to each other for advice,plastic pots 30 liters diversion and guidance. The geographers Richard Symanski and Nancy Burley, in their 1973 paper published in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers; state that the purchase price of the land at Sosúa was $100,000 in stock in DORSA.10 Then again, Rosenberg and Rosen did not want to accept the lands at Sosúa as a gift, but preferred that Trujillo exchange the land for a fixed amount of stock in DORSA. It was agreed upon that the Trujillo would be given shares which had a value of approximately $100,000 U.S.D., in spite of his desire to present the land at Sosúa to DORSA as a gift without any strings attached. Rosenberg’s Diary I has details of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the contract that transferred the title of the property to DORSA in 1940.

The negotiations transpired over a period of weeks with some of them taking place over cocktails at one of Trujillo’s many parties. Indeed, Rosenberg’s diary is replete with personal observations of these lively assemblies. Reading it one is left with a mental picture of elegant balls, luncheons and official state dinners. Then again, Trujillo had a reputation as a social carouser and loved to be at the center of attention.Rosenburg wanted to avoid any negative perception that would certainly accompany any gift of Dominican property to DORSA. Both Rosen and Rosenberg wanted to foster an image of independence, that the Jewish refugees were not a charity case looking for free handouts and were able to stand on their own. It was widely believed that the Jew abhorred physical labor of any type, preferring the urban environs to the slow, seasonal rhythms of rural farms. Trujillo’s sale of the Sosúa property would give the Jewish refugees the opportunity to prove that they were a hardy folk who could withstand the privations that came with an agricultural and rural life. Long periods of isolation and hard work were preferable to the alternative of imprisonment and certain death at the hands of the hated Nazis. Again, Trujillo wanted to allow only those refugees with an agricultural background into the Dominican Republic. A consensus was reached between Trujillo and DORSA which called for only strong and able young males and couples to begin the settlement at Sosúa. Indeed, many of the refugees who sought visas to the Dominican Republic “had no interest in working on less than fertile land [and] lacked the skills, inclination or physical capacity for farm work. Most refugees could not transform themselves into plausible farmers.”El Generalíssimo Trujillo relaxed his previous stipulations which called for settlers with agricultural skill sets, writing that “no settler should become a financial burden on the state.”One refugee couple, who wished to immigrate to the Dominican Republic from their temporary residence in London, was told by an American, Solomon Trone, who “came to sign up people willing to settle in Sosúa that he could arrange for anybody willing to go to Sosúa to be released. In spite of their total lack of agricultural skills, the couple was told by one who had already made the journey to Sosúa that “Nobody in Sosúa knows anything. You just start applying for a place.”Rosen had a well-established track record regarding the founding of Jewish agricultural settlements, and the academic credentials to allow him access to the checkbooks of Jewish philanthropies and donors. Born in Moscow in 1877, Rosen came to America in 1903, landing in New York virtually penniless. Rosen worked at several different odd jobs to feed, clothe and house himself. He eventually went west in search of better opportunities, and found employment at a farm in Lansing, Michigan, where he worked for two years. In 1905, Rosen enrolled in the Michigan Agricultural College-now Michigan State University in East Lansing, as a special student. During his pursuit of an education at the school he worked as an assistant at the college library, and also wrote several articles on American agriculture for different Russian publications.

The production of irrigated crops is constrained by water availability and prices

We explore sensitivity to spatially heterogeneous future impacts by incorporating a subset of the 35 yield change scenarios from the AgMIP global gridded crop model intercomparison study into GCAM’s exogenous agricultural assumptions. The scenarios selected have been found to span a range of global impacts in previous GCAM versions. Each GGCM assesses the effects on yields of RCP 8.5 changes in CO2 , temperature, and precipitation from five bias-corrected global circulation models for rainfed and perfectly irrigated versions of crops. Water for irrigation is constrained in the version of GCAM used for analysis. We apply crop impacts in one of two ways: only in the U.S. and everywhere . This work is consistent with earlier work using different models to consider similar scenarios regarding the importance of international impacts, adding robustness to the findings through the use of a different multi-sector model. We find that international impacts could be as important as domestic impacts for the financial value of U.S. agricultural crop production in across spatially and temporally varying agricultural impacts scenarios. Crucially, there are scenarios in which examining only domestic impacts would lead to a fundamentally different analysis of the future of U.S. agricultural crop production than if one considered the combined effects of domestic and international impacts. Therefore, while there is uncertainty about climate impacts on future crop yields, evidence suggests that the importance of international effects on the financial value of U.S. crop production is robust across this uncertainty.GCAM couples human and physical Earth systems to explore the impacts of economic and environmental policies. GCAM is calibrated to historical data through 2010 and then simulates forward from 2010 to 2100 in five year time steps by incorporating changes in quantities such as population, GDP, technology, and policy to produce outputs that include land use, emissions, and commodity prices. Specifically, GCAM can assimilate high spatial resolution information on the global distribution of crop yields and analyze its effects on the coupled system of global agriculture markets. This and previous versions of GCAM track long term trend behavior rather than inter annual variability . All scenarios in this study follow Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2,vertical farm tower the “middle-of-the-road” socio-economic scenario.

The associated GCAM scenario provides the reference against which we measure impacts in this study. GCAM represents the energy system in 32 economic regions, and it represents global production in 384 agricultural and land-use regions. Each of the 384 land units in GCAM represents a water basin-economic region combination. Twenty-three of these lie within the U.S. With each land unit, GCAM allocates land across more than a dozen types based on cover and use. Allocation is based on a logit formulation to optimize profitability, with details provided in Wise et al . Important to this study, GCAM models production of a range of agricultural commodities , each with four different management types . S1 Fig illustrates the land competition nests used by GCAM v5.2 in each GCAM land unit . S1 Table in the S1 File provides the mappings between crops in the FAOSTAT database and GCAM commodities. Some GCAM commodities are straightforward , but some GCAM commodities are economic aggregates, such as Misc Crop and OilCrop . The span of GCAM commodities allows a relatively full modeling of the agricultural sector of economies. On the supply side of agricultural crop production in GCAM, the “no impacts” baseline yield change assumptions are read in exogenously. These yield changes are used by GCAM to calculate the profitability of a GCAM crop-irrigation-fertilizer combination in each GCAM land unit at each time step. This profitability determines land allocated to each land type . The combination of exogenous yields and endogenous land allocation gives production of each crop-irrigation-management combination in each land unit. Because land shares allocated to rainfed versus irrigated, high versus low fertilizer versions of each crop may change, the aggregate yield for each crop output by GCAM will differ from the input yields. In other words, there is endogenous yield intensification in GCAM. AgMIP yield impacts are incorporated as multipliers on the exogenous yield assumptions used by GCAM .The GCAM food demand system creates a slightly elastic portion of demand for each crop type, based on the exogenous population and GDP assumptions GCAM takes as inputs. Therefore, the minimum quantity defined by the food demand system must be met globally by GCAM agricultural crop production.

Other demand sectors are more elastic. For some GCAM agricultural commodities, such as Corn and Oil Crop, this leads to an overall more elastic total demand function because GCAM explicitly models the energy sector and the accompanying price-sensitive demand for use of these crops as bio-fuels. Crops such as Wheat and Rice that are primarily used to feed humans have nearly perfectly inelastic demand. This lends an extra layer of difficulty to analysis of the dynamics in any particular agricultural impacts scenario. Since both supply and demand schedules may shift, there is never a single mechanism that may be identified for any particular price change. GCAM includes mechanisms on both the supply and demand side that allow for adaptation behavior. Specifically, because there is a price elasticity of demand for GCAM agricultural crop commodities , reduction of quantity demanded is one available mechanism in the model. This includes changing demand for animal feed and bio-energy in response to changing prices. On the supply side, economic agents can endogenously adjust land allocation in response to changes in profit rates between rainfed or irrigated versions of crops . Additionally, the option to shift to higher nitrogen fertilizer per unit of land is included, which leads to an increase in both the yield and the cost per unit of land . Pesticide use is currently not explicitly modeled, and therefore changes to pesticide use are not included as an adaptation option in GCAM. Finally, GCAM includes trade of agricultural crop commodities and the ability for producers to shift land allocation among commodities as profit rates change with yield and price changes. A significant difference between the version of GCAM used in this paper and the version documented in detail, is that GCAM 5.2 features different agricultural crop trade behavior. Previously, GCAM modeled completely flexible trade with nearly all agricultural commodities traded freely on a global market with no explicit distinction between domestically-produced and imported products and a common global market price. The version of GCAM used for this study employs a system that is based on an Armington distinction between domestically-produced and imported products . In this new approach in GCAM, we specify region-specific agricultural markets at the 32-region level. Regional demand is an explicitly modeled choice between domestic production and imports from the global market via a nested logit structure, similar to our modeling of land use allocation in GCAM .

International trade is not modeled as explicit bilateral trade but instead as a single market for each commodity that contains all regional gross imports and gross exports. Additional details may be found in the S1 File.We examine the implications of agricultural impacts to U.S. producers through the use of four varying crop-climate model combinations in the AgMIP/ISIMIP global gridded crop model inter comparison study CO2 fertilization effects, driven by RCP 8.5 earth system changes. RCP 8.5 is a climate scenario that features large changes in temperature, CO2, and precipitation and therefore relatively larger local changes in crop yields produced by crop models than under the other RCPs. It was selected with the idea that the larger yield change signal in RCP 8.5 would aid in identifying the emergent mechanisms that dictate the future economic changes resulting from yield changes. The other RCPs are deserving of future examination, but one would expect that the policies applied to reduce emissions would then interact with the impacts of correspondingly smaller yield changes. The GCAM reference scenario to which these crop yield impacts are applied has no climate policies in place. We use AgMIP global gridded yields from each of the EPIC and LPJmL crop models driven by five GCMs under RCP 8.5. Each scenario models yields for different collections of crops. Further, these collections of crops differ from the commodities modeled in GCAM. Yield data is available for both perfectly irrigated and locally rainfed versions of each crop. These gridded yields are aggregated to the GCAM land units using MIRCA2000 harvested area data for weighting. At the basin scale, time series of yields are converted to multipliers by dividing by the historical baseline average yield for each crop-irrigation-basin combination. Finally, these crop-irrigation-basin specific multipliers are converted from the crop model specific crop types to multipliers for each GCAM commodity irrigation-basin combination using GTAP harvested area weights from the GCAM data system for aggregation. This method for incorporating climate driven yield changes as multipliers on GCAM’s exogenous yield assumptions follows methods used in the broader literature. GCAM’s biomass crop commodity receives the median of impacts to all other commodities,vertical plant tower for each irrigation-management practice combination, in each basin. Fig 1 is a schematic summarizing this processing pipeline. S2 Table in S1 File lists the mapping between AgMIP model crops and GCAM commodities used to estimate multipliers. Corresponding water supply constraints for irrigated crops are used for each scenario. Impacts are not applied to grassland or forest to isolate the role of impacts on crop yields.Results are presented for a variety of physical and economic output variables from GCAM. Due to both the variability and the relatively small sample size of spatially heterogeneous climate-crop impact scenarios available for this paper, summary statistics across scenarios are not presented. Rather, the results presented here focus on relationships between the Domestic and the Full scenarios that emerge in each of the different climate-crop impact combinations considered.

To this end, Figs 2 and 3, and S3 Fig illustrate the percent change relative to the no impacts reference GCAM scenario for several economic and physical variables in 2050 at the aggregate U.S. level for different GCAM commodities, under for all scenarios in the work. Fig 2 focuses results on Corn and OilCrop, globally important commodities for which the U.S. is a major producer. Fig 3 presents results for Rice and Wheat, important commodities with more spatially distributed production across the globe. S3 Fig presents results for the remaining GCAM commodities. The variables plotted include Area allocated to each commodity , the U.S. commodity Price, the production Prod of each commodity , and the aggregate endogenous yield change EndYld . Results are also included for changes in revenue Revto examine an aggregate direction of change between Price and Prod, as both variables are important to U.S. producers.Price changes are a primary economic mechanism through which international yield changes are transmitted to U.S. agricultural producers. Because agricultural commodities are traded across the globe, the prices of these commodities are affected by events that occur both in the U.S. and internationally. An event that affects U.S. yields will have consequences for U.S. production but also for prices in the rest of the world and will therefore affect production throughout the world agricultural system. The reverse also holds. Because the U.S. is a significant but not majority contributor to the global agricultural market for most crops, the magnitude of U.S. price changes in the Domestic is consistently smaller than in the Full scenario, across all climate-crop impact combinations for all GCAM commodities, illustrated in Figs 2 and 3 and S3 Fig. This is regardless of whether prices have increased or decreased relative to the baseline scenario, consistent with many of the results reported. Further, applying impacts in the Full case versus in the Domestic results in differing price changes from reference, even for commodities such as Corn that display very similar values in the Full and Domestic cases for physical variables such as area, production, and endogenous yield. It is possible that the relationship between the Full impacts price change from reference and the Domestic impacts price change from reference may break down as the structure of the system being modeled fundamentally changes. For example, in a more restrictive trade scenario, U.S. producers would be more restricted in their options to respond to future climate and prices would be increasingly dictated solely by the direct impacts on U.S. productivity. For commodities such as Corn and Oil Crop, for which the U.S. is a significant producer and exporter, a major shock only to U.S. production is closer in magnitude to a shock across the entire world than it would be for other commodities.

The nine RWBs use different approaches to assess and control agricultural discharges

Aquifers also help move water from areas of recharge finding to areas dominated by extraction that are miles or — in very large aquifers — a few tens of miles away. Unfortunately, in many areas of California we have not been replenishing this account sufficiently during wet years. Groundwater resources across California’s agricultural regions have been more stressed during the current drought than at any other time in history finding. In most wells, depth to groundwater has exceeded that of the same or nearby wells in the 2007–2009 drought, and exceeds the depths recorded in the mid-20th century, prior to local, state and federal water projects finding coming on-line. The demand for groundwater has been increasing due to the increased acreage of intensively grown crops, large-scale conversion of range land and field crops to permanent crops and uncertainty about water deliveries from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, the heart of California’s elaborate surface water conveyance system finding.Lower groundwater levels have significantly increased pumping costs and increased the need for constructing deeper wells where existing wells were not sufficiently deep to access falling water levels finding. Greater reliance on groundwater during the drought has caused land subsidence on a large scale in the Central Valley finding, coastal basins and Southern California; it has also exacerbated seawater intrusion where pumping occurs in aquifers near the coast finding. As pumping lowers the water table, water quality is sometimes compromised by saline water or other naturally occurring contaminants finding. Rapidly falling water tables also lead to more-contaminated shallow groundwater entering drinking water wells. Agricultural regions in California are challenged not only by dwindling groundwater supplies — a critical drought insurance for California — but also by significant groundwater quality degradation, in particular from nitrate and salt pollution. Pollutants may come from urban sources finding,vertical farm system domestic household sources finding or agricultural sources finding.

A number of studies have shown a high incidence of nitrate, above drinking water standards, in domestic and public drinking water supply wells; in some counties, more than 40% of domestic wells exceed the nitrate limit for safe drinking water finding. Salt accumulation in streams and groundwater has also been found to be significant finding, with potentially punitive economic consequences: By 2030, the combined impact of surface water and groundwater salinization to agriculture and the California economy, if current conditions continue and no preventative action is taken, is estimated at $6 to $10 billion annually in lost production costs, job losses and other impacts finding. The problems of groundwater overdraft and water quality degradation have been recognized for some time. Increasing public concern over the past two decades has raised the level of local, state and federal government engagement and of actions by policy- and decision makers. Groundwater users and wastewater dischargers in the urban and the agricultural sectors face new regulatory requirements. While urban governments have a long history of dealing with limited water resources, the agricultural community is experiencing significant and historic changes in its involvement with managing groundwater extraction and protecting groundwater resources for the future. Based on these principles, the legislation lays out a framework for the entire state to manage its groundwater. In 127 medium- and high-priority groundwater basins finding, groundwater sustainability agencies finding will have to be formed no later than June 2017. These GSAs will be responsible for developing and implementing a groundwater sustainability plan finding that has specific objectives and meets specified sustainability targets consistent with the core principles of the SGMA. GSAs have 3 to 5 years to develop and begin implementing their GSP finding. GSAs must show significant progress in implementing their plan and achieve sustainability no later than 2042.Funding for GSP activities will likely come from a combination of state and local funding sources. In over drafted basins, adjudications may continue to be an alternative process to achieve sustainability, despite the high cost and often years-long legal proceedings involved. As of this writing, the Legislature is actively considering multiple bills that would create an alternative, streamlined adjudication process.

In the intermediate and long run, the main impact from this legislation will be that new recharge and groundwater storage options will be pursued, and, where needed, pumpers may see restrictions in pumping or well drilling. Where additional recharge is available, pumpers may be asked to pay additional costs to secure the recharge needed in return for their right to continue pumping. Basin boundaries may be adjusted and may include fractured rock aquifers currently not recognized as groundwater basins by the Department of Water Resources although they are subject to significant groundwater extraction in some areas. Litigation and state intervention may be inevitable in some cases, but it remains to be seen how frequently that route will be chosen over mediation or facilitated GSP development and implementation. In either case, the new groundwater legislation marks a turning point in California water management by no longer allowing for continued depletion of groundwater resources and by requiring an active, well-informed groundwater management system that is better integrated with surface water management, water quality management and land use decisions to maintain a balance that best serves competing human, economic and environmental health interests.The federal Clean Water Act addresses only surface water quality. By contrast, California’s water quality law, the Porter Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1969 finding, includes the protection of groundwater quality. The California Legislature designated the State Water Resources Control Board finding and nine newly created regional water boards finding to implement the Porter-Cologne Act. The primary function of the RWBs is to establish a basin plan that identifies water quality goals and to develop regulatory programs to achieve those goals. Non-point sources of potential groundwater pollution finding were long exempted from direct oversight through unconditional waste discharge waivers. However, those waivers were discontinued by the Legislature in 2002, which led to new regulatory requirements for agricultural and other non-point source water dischargers finding. Focused on surface water quality in the first decade after 2002, these regulatory efforts now increasingly address groundwater quality. They require demonstrable source control and documentation of groundwater nitrate and salt discharges and also provide state and federal funds to improve the drinking water supplies of communities affected by poor groundwater quality.

The Central Valley RWB and Central Coast RWB regions are home to large areas of California’s most intensive agricultural operations and have therefore developed the most extensive regulations. But all RWBs are obligated to consider discharges from non-point sources to groundwater and to develop basin plan amendments for nutrient and salt management finding.The 2007 Dairy Order was the first comprehensive California groundwater quality permitting program applicable specifically to farms. It sets the framework for permitting dairy discharges of nutrients and salts to surface water and groundwater. The dairy order requires dairies to prepare nutrient and waste management plans, annually report nutrient budgets for individual fields, tonnage of manure exports and water quality of on-site wells. Targeted shallow groundwater monitoring and efforts to develop improved management practices that demonstrably improve groundwater quality are implemented through the Central Valley Dairy Representative Monitoring Program. This program is led by a coalition of dairy producers that is working closely with the RWB; it offers an efficient alternative to individual dairy groundwater monitoring plans.Upon its inception in the early 2000s, the Central Valley ILRP finding focused on surface water and watershed protection through farmer education, certification and coalition-led stream water quality monitoring and management. But since 2010, the Central Valley RWB has been expanding the ILRP to add elements that also protect and improve groundwater quality, primarily nitrate, pesticide and salt contamination, through source management on irrigated lands. In the Central Valley, the ILRP covers about 7 million irrigated acres with several tens of thousands of individual farms. Permits finding are given either to individual farms or to regional ILRP coalitions, organizations that farms can join to represent them collectively with the RWB. ILRP coalitions representing large groups of farmers include the Sacramento River Watershed, Rice Farmers, Eastern San Joaquin Watershed, San Joaquin County and Delta, Western San Joaquin Watershed, Tulare Lake Basin Area, and Western Tulare Lake Basin Area coalitions. Each coalition is subject to a separate RWB order. Under the expanded ILRP, the first step is a Groundwater Assessment Report finding, which is currently being developed or has been developed by each of the coalitions. The assessment identifies historic and current groundwater quality conditions and identifies vulnerable groundwater regions. The assessment provides the rationale for the monitoring and reporting requirements, which may differ within and between regions, and allows for a tiered program of monitoring and reporting requirements for sub-regions to reflect the diverse potential impacts to groundwater. In a next step, beginning in 2015, field specific nutrient management planning forms will need to be completed by all farmers for the first time. Generally, farmers will now be required to implement management practices, keep appropriate records finding and report some of the information collected to their coalition. The coalitions are further responsible for performing groundwater monitoring, typically in a network of domestic and monitoring wells. As in the dairy program,vertical indoor farming the coalitions are also responsible for developing management practices that demonstrably improve and protect groundwater quality. A significant focus will be on documenting field nitrogen inputs and outputs and on improving nitrogen-use efficiency.In 2012, the Central Coast RWB adopted an update to the ILRP, called the Agricultural Order finding. The program covers about 4,000 farms on about 400,000 acres. Based on its own groundwater assessment work, the RWB created three tiers of farms depending on the potential risk they pose to groundwater quality. The tiers are determined by pesticide use, farm size, nitrate occurrence in nearby public supply and farm wells, and by crop type.

About one in seven farms are in the highest tier, tier three finding, about half of the farms, mostly vineyards, fall in the lowest tier finding, and the remainder are in tier two. As in the Central Valley, farms in all tiers are required to perform proper nutrient, pesticide and irrigation management, documented in their farm plans finding. Back flow prevention and proper well abandonment are also required on all farms. Unlike in the Central Valley ILRP, all farms need to sample groundwater from existing wells twice during the first year. Subsequent groundwater sampling frequency is greater for farms in tier three than in tier two or one. Farms can choose to implement the groundwater sampling program individually or join a coalition that has been created specifically to perform groundwater monitoring and to support farmers with the implementation of the Agricultural Regulatory Program.Operating at an even larger scale and affecting stakeholders beyond agriculture finding is the Central Valley Salinity Alternatives for Long-Term Sustainability finding program. In coordination with the RWB, it was created in 2009 by stakeholders to develop a comprehensive salt and nutrient basin plan amendment for the Central Valley that complies with the state’s recycled water policy finding. The development of the basin plan amendment includes a wide range of assessments by CV-SALTS: nitrate and salt source loading from agricultural, urban and industrial sources, extensive review of surface water and groundwater quality data, and development of potential management practice and infrastructure solutions. The CV-SALTS program builds upon and is coordinated with the Central Valley Dairy Order and ILRP efforts. It focuses in particular on avoiding future salinization of the Central Valley aquifer system under SWRCB’s overarching antidegradation policy. Stakeholders are organized within the Central Valley Salinity Coalition finding, which is scheduled to provide its final salt and nutrient management plan finding to the RWB in 2016. As part of these efforts, a recent Strategic Salt Accumulation and Transport Study finding compared historic water quality data to an assessment of current salt and nutrient loading in the Central Valley; it determined that approximately 1.2 million acre-feet of Central Valley groundwater needs to be desalinized annually to meet long-term irrigation and drinking water standards. SSALTS suggests various alternatives for water treatment, including desalination and evaporation ponds. Implementation costs are estimated to be roughly $70 billion over the next 30 years, of which $20 billion can be raised by selling approximately 1.1 million acrefeet of ultra clean treated water annually to urban areas. These costs include some saline water being disposed of by deep injection and some being stored in salt accumulation areas on the Tulare Lake Bed finding.